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Domestic and International Administrative
Tools to Combat Fraud & Corruption: A
Comparison of US Suspension and
Debarment with the World Bank's
Sanctions System
Pascale Hline Duboist

INTRODUCTION
Although numerous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
and international organizations make it their mission to challenge the oft-presumed inevitability of fraud and corruption,
such misconduct in various forms continues to contaminate the
work of private businesses, individual governments, and intergovernmental organizations. The number and types of regulatory
tools that aim to monitor and discourage corrupt behavior have
also grown at domestic, regional, and international levels. Bribery is a particularly salient example of such misconduct, and the
United States has acted as a conspicuous and early pioneer in
fighting bribery and other misconduct.
The US Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act'
(FCPA) in 1977, after the infamous Watergate scandal, in which
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an investigation into President Nixon's campaign contributions
revealed prolific overseas bribery by US corporations. 2 Such
payments to foreign officials in exchange for business opportunities were not illegal in the United States or any other country at
the time. 3 The FCPA explicitly criminalized bribe payments to
foreign officials, as distinguished from bribes paid to American
government officials, which were already illegal under existing
US laws.
Over the next thirty years, the focus on foreign bribery became a truly international concept when, under pressure from
the US, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and, later, the United Nations (UN), drafted
conventions targeting foreign bribery. Not surprisingly, international institutions such as the World Bank (hereinafter "the
Bank")4 also began to address this issue. In 1996, the Bank formally drafted procedures to address accusations of fraud and
corruption under Bank-financed contracts; the OECD promulgated its Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions in 1997;5 and
the United Nations Convention against Corruption was signed in
2003.6 Although the Bank's efforts to combat corruption have
been described as a component of the post-FCPA international
response to foreign bribery,7 the Bank's sanctions system is, in

1 Foreign

Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub L No 95-213, 91 Stat 1494, codified at

15 USC § 78dd-1 et seq.

2 See Spotlight: History of the FCPA: How a Tough U.S. Anti-Bribery Law Came to
Pass, The Business of Bribes (Frontline/World Feb 13, 2009), online at http://www.pbs.
org/frontlineworld/stories/bribe/2009/02/history-of-the-fcpa.html (visited Sept 10, 2012).
3 Id.
4 The World Bank is composed of two institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA).
The World Bank is one part of a larger group of institutions known as the World Bank
Group, which also includes the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Center for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID). See The World Bank Group, Who We Are: Five Agencies,
One Group (World Bank Jan 19, 2012), online at http://go.worldbank.org/BLDCT5JMIO
(visited Sept 10, 2012).
5 Council of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in InternationalBusiness Transaction, C(97)123/FINAL (May 23, 1997), online at http://www.oecd.org/document/21/0,3746,
en_2649_34859_20178131 1_1_1,00.html (visited Sept 10, 2012).
6 United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Convention Against Corruption,
Resolution 58/4, UN Doc A/58/422 (October 31, 2003), online at http://www.unodc.org/uno
dc/en/treaties/CAC/(visited Sept 10, 2012).
7 See Stuart H. Deming, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the New International Norms 305-06, 347-54 (ABA 2d ed 2010).
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fact, a somewhat broader, quasi-judicial administrative system
that addresses accusations of corruption, fraud, collusion, coercion, and obstructive practices in connection with Bank-financed
projects.
During the development stage of the Bank's sanctions system, several models were considered, including those of diverse
national agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and other
development banks. A committee tasked with reviewing the
Bank's anticorruption procedure observed that US government
agencies' debarment practices "would be the most pertinent from
the Bank's standpoint." The committee referred specifically to
the suspension and debarment provisions within the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).9
The FAR is a broad-ranging administrative rule1 0 that governs contracting by executive agencies within the US government. Although it contains numerous provisions with respect to
procurement, the component most relevant to this Article is Subpart 9.4, which governs the debarment and suspension of certain
contractors."

The creation of the Bank's sanctions system may well have
been prompted by the thematic antibribery focus of the FCPA.12
However-as this Article will show-the substantive details of
the sanctions system's provisions are strongly reflective of the
broader, quality-of-procurement approach of the FAR's Subpart
9.4.
In Section I, the Article will provide an overview of the US
debarment system under the FAR by reviewing the causes for
exclusion, the procedures leading to a decision, the period and
effects of exclusion, the availability of judicial review, and the
use of administrative agreements. 13 After reviewing the FAR
8 Dick Thornburgh, Ronald L. Gainer, and Cuyler H. Walker, Report ConcerningThe
Debarment Processes Of The World Bank, 3-4 n 2 (World Bank Aug 14, 2002), online at
(visited
http: //siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOIIJResources/thornburghreport.pdf
Sept 10, 2012).
9 See id.
10 The FAR is promulgated by the General Services Administration, the Department
of Defense, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration under the authority
of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act of 1974. See Pub L No 93-400, 88 Stat
796, codified at 41 USC §§ 401-38. See also DoD, GSA, and NASA, Establishing the Federal Acquisition Regulation: Final Rule, 48 Fed Reg 42142 (Sept 19, 1983).
11 48 CFR § 9.400 et seq.
12 Deming, The FCPA at 347 (cited in note 7).
13 An "administrative agreement" or "compliance agreement" is an agreement in lieu
of suspension or debarment between a contractor and the federal agency that has alleged
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process, in Section II, the Article will provide a detailed explanation of the Bank's administrative sanctions system by examining
the system's components: the sanctionable practices, the sanctions process, the types and scope of sanctions, and the use of
negotiated settlements-many of which are analogous to the
FAR system. Although the systems appear to mirror each other
in several respects, this Article will point to critical distinctions
in their applications and effects. Section III concludes, noting
that both systems have yielded results, and suggesting that diverse approaches to fighting fraud and corruption in procurement can be both effective and vital.
I. THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION 14
As the world's largest single buyer of goods and services,15
the United States government has an interest in ensuring its
funds are being used appropriately. Indeed, as a matter of policy,
the federal government seeks to prevent the improper dissipation
of public funds in its contracting activities by doing business only
with responsible contractors.16 To this end, the United States
employs a suspension and debarment system that seeks to preclude US government agencies from entering into new contractual dealings with contractors whose actions suggest they are not
responsible in fulfilling their legal or contractual obligations. 7
By examining the "present responsibility" of a contractor,
any US agency is able to render a contractor ineligible for new
government contracts, thereby reducing the overall risk of harm
a violation meriting exclusion. The agreement's provisions are, at least in part, negotiable, and there is no standard form. The agreement typically includes an acceptance of
responsibility for the conduct that gave rise to the agreement, as well as requirements for
the respondent to create a code of ethics, conduct employee training, and establish internal monitoring and compliance programs. Violation of an administrative agreement is
itself an independent cause for debarment. Richard J. Bednar, et al, eds, The Practitioner's Guide to Suspension and Debarment i-ii (ABA 3d ed 2002).
14 48 CFR § 9.400 et seq.
15 See US Small Business Administration, Contracting Opportunities, online at
http://archive.sba.gov/contractingopportunities/index.html (visited Sept 10, 2012) ("The
world's largest buyer of goods and services is the Federal Government, with purchases
totaling more than $425 billion per year.").
16 48 CFR § 9.402(a) (directing agencies to "solicit offers from, award contracts to,
and consent to subcontracts with responsible contractors only").
" 48 CFR § 9.402(a) ("Debarment and suspension are discretionary actions that ...
are appropriate means to effectuate [the] policy of dealing with responsible contractors
only."). See also Kate M. Manuel, Debarment and Suspension of Government Contractors:
An Overview of the Law Including Recently Enacted and Proposed Amendments 5 (Congressional Research Service Aug 16, 2010).
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to the procurement system.18 Under the FAR, each executive
branch department and agency has a designated suspending and
debarring official (an SDO) who has the authority to suspend and
debar nonresponsible contractors. 19 At the same time that the
FAR seeks to protect the US government, it establishes processes
that ensure that all contractors facing debarment receive due
process. 20
This Article focuses on suspension and debarment under the
FAR as it is the mechanism that is most analogous to the Bank's
sanctions system, given the FAR's administrative nature and
regulation of procurement programs and activities. 21 The Article
will examine the following aspects of the FAR system: (1) causes
for debarment; (2) procedures; (3) period and effect of debarment;
(4) judicial review; and (5) administrative agreements.
A.

Causes for Debarment

Generally speaking, the FAR's causes for debarment can be
grouped into the following categories: (i) conviction of a crime or
civil fraud, (ii) poor contract performance, or (iii) other serious
misconduct showing that the contractor is not responsible. 22 Regarding the first group, the SDO may debar a contractor based
upon a criminal conviction or civil judgment for commission of
1s See, for example, Caiola v Carroll,851 F2d 395, 398-99 (DC Cir 1988) ("The security of the United States, and thus of the general public, depends upon the quality and
reliability of items supplied by these contractors. When items enter the supply system
through fraud or deceit, the national security, public welfare, and personal safety are all
potentially compromised and endangered.").
19 See Steven A. Shaw, Suspension and Debarment in a Nutshell 1 (United States
Department of the Air Force 2011), online at http://www.safgc.hq.af.millshared/medial
document/AFD-110314-018.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012).
20 For an opposite view, see Kathleen Miller, U.S. Seeks to Debar Federal Contractors, The Washington Post A18 (Dec 26, 2011) (highlighting how contractors argued that
the Obama administration's uptick in debarments may have undermined due process).
21 The FAR regulates government procurement programs and activities. The Nonprocurement Common Rule is used by executive agencies to suspend, debar, or exclude contractors from participating in nonprocurement transactions under Executive Order
12549. See 48 CFR § 9.403. Nonprocurement transactions include grants, cooperative
agreements, scholarships, fellowships, contracts of assistance, loans, loan guarantees,
subsidies, insurance, payments for specified use, and donation agreements. Id. A debarment or a suspension action under either the procurement or the nonprocurement umbrella has government-wide effects across the entire array of federal agencies. See Executive Order 12689, 54 Fed Reg 34131 (1989). Further, a procurement debarment also
makes the respondent ineligible for participation in federal assistance programs. Id. A
nonprocurement debarment also makes the respondent ineligible for federal government
contracting. 48 CFR § 9.401.
22 See Shaw, Suspension and Debarment at 1 (cited in note 19).
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fraud or upon a conviction for any number of criminal offenses.
The specific civil and criminal violations that provide a basis for
debarment may themselves be grouped into three categories: violations relating to public contracts and transactions, violations of
certain statutes, and other offenses indicating a lack of business
honesty. 23
The second group of causes for an SDO's debarment decision
are fact-based. Although these causes have historically been associated with poor contract performance, in recent years they
have also followed uncharged criminal and civil violations. 24 This
category of offenses does not rely on an indictment, conviction, or
civil judgment, but instead requires a preponderance of the evidence to demonstrate that the contractor violated contract or
subcontract terms or committed other wrongdoing serious
enough to justify debarment.2 5 A "willful failure to perform" or a
"history of failure to perform, or of unsatisfactory performance"
in accordance with the terms of "one or more contracts" would
constitute such a violation. 26
Finally, an SDO may debar a contractor based on "any other
cause of so serious or compelling a nature that it affects the present responsibility of the contractor or subcontractor." 27 This category of causes is known as the "catch-all" provision 28 because it
provides the SDO with broad discretion to take action for conduct
not encompassed by the other categories-such as negligent performance of a commercial contract-where such conduct affected
the contractor's present responsibility. 2 9
Figure 1 below provides of summary of the three categories
of misconduct discussed above.

23 See Bednar, The Practitioner'sGuide at 65-66 (cited in note 13). See also 48 CFR

§ 9.406-2(a).
24 Fact-based debarments are relatively uncommon because most debarments arise
as collateral consequences of criminal investigations or prosecutions. See James J.
McCullough and Abram J. Pafford, Government Contract Suspension and Debarment:
What Every ContractorNeeds to Know, 13 Pub Procurement L Rev 240, 242 (2004).
25 See 48 CFR § 9.406-2(b)(1). See also Bednar, The Practitioner'sGuide at 67 (cited
in note 13); Shaw, Suspension and Debarment at 2 (cited in note 19).
26 48 CFR § 9.406-2(b)(1)(i). See also Bednar, The Practitioner'sGuide at 67 (cited in
note 13); Shaw, Suspension and Debarmentat 2 (cited in note 19).
27 48 CFR § 9.406-2(c).
28 Manuel, Debarment and Suspension of Government Contractors at 1, 15 (cited in
note 17). See also Bednar, The Practitioner'sGuide at 69 (cited in note 13).
29 See Bednar, The Practitioner'sGuide at 69-70 (cited in note 13).
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FIGURE 1. SUMMARY OF CAUSES FOR DEBARMENT UNDER
THE FAR

Criminal or civil

conviction/judgment

Poor contract
performa nce

violations relating to public
contracts and transactions

sufficiently serious
violation of
contract/subcontract
terms (for example,
"willful failure to perform")

Other
serious
misconduct

'catch-all" provision

violations of certain
statutes

other offenses indicating
lack of business honesty

B.

Procedures for Debarment
1. Referral and sources of evidence.

The FAR deals solely with the administrative remedy of
suspension and debarment and does not address the issue of how
referrals of improper conduct are brought to the SDO's attention.
In practice, debarring officials consider evidence of improper
conduct from many sources, including both referrals from investigators, fraud counsel, auditors, contracting officials, prosecutors, and, on occasion, from the public. 3 0 For each, the debarring
official undertakes the same analysis in determining whether
sufficient evidence exists and whether administrative action is
necessary to protect the government. The investigators mentioned are not part of the debarring official's office. An investigator acts independently, and his or her interest in a case, in most
instances, goes beyond purely the administrative remedy of suspension and debarment and includes criminal, civil, and contractual remedies.
Agencies are also required by the FAR to establish procedures for the appropriate reporting, investigation, and referral of
30 See, for example, id at 62-63.
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matters to the SDO. 3 1 The United States Department of Agriculture, for instance, prescribes the general documents to be submitted with a referral. 32 The Department of Defense provides a
detailed list of the information that should be included in a referral to the appropriate SDO, including an estimate of the damages incurred by the alleged misconduct. 33 The United States Agency for International Development employs a contrasting approach, with a brief and direct referral to the FAR. 3 4
a) Determinationof lead agency. Because federal contractors sometimes work with several agency clients simultaneously,
a suspension or debarment proceeding under the FAR may impact agencies beyond the one that received the evidence of alleged impropriety. 35 Prior to initiating a debarment or suspension action, the SDO that is seeking suspension will notify other
government agencies, through the Interagency Suspension and
Debarment Committee (ISDC), that it is considering such action,
and will request the role of lead agency. In the event that another agency's SDO objects, then the SDOs coordinate among themselves regarding how to proceed. If the matter cannot be resolved
informally, the ISDC is empowered to resolve the issue. 36 The
agencies involved may accomplish this task by informally consulting with one another, or the ISDC may resolve the issue. In
practice, lead agency requests are handled without issue or involvement of the ISDC.

a1 See 48 CFR § 9.406-3(a).
32 See 48 CFR § 409.406-3(a) ("The case must be accompanied by a complete statement of the facts .. . along with a recommendation for action.").
3 See 48 CFR § 209.406-3; DFARS Procedures,Guidance, and Information, 209.4063(a)(8) (Department of Defense 2004), online at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/pgi/pgi
htm/PGI209_4.htm#209.406-3 (visited Sept 10, 2012).
34 See Eligibility of Suppliers, Contractors, and Recipients, Automatic Directives
System 313.3.2.1 (US Agency for International Development 2011), online at
http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/300/313.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012) ("USAID mustfollow
[sic] the FAR 9.4 for all procurement suspension and debarment actions and 22 CFR 208
for all non-procurement actions.").
35 See Bednar, The Practitioner'sGuide at 64 (cited in note 13).
36 See 48 CFR § 9.402(d). The FAR does not prescribe a particular method for determining the lead agency, but rather encourages the agencies to establish methods and
procedures for coordinating their debarment or suspension actions. See 48 CFR § 9.402(c).
See also Bednar, The Practitioner'sGuide at 64-65 (cited in note 13); InteragencySuspension and Debarment Committee (EPA Jan 14, 2010), online at http://www.epa.gov/ogd/
sddlisdc.htm (visited Sept 10, 2012).
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b) SDO's consideration of debarment. The SDO for the
designated lead agency then reviews the referred evidence to determine whether it supports a finding under the FAR of one of
the listed causes for debarment.3 7 This review can occur when an
agency receives an indictment, conviction, or civil judgment from
a US Attorney's office, an Inspector General, another government investigative organization, a contracting officer, or the media. 38 For fact-based cases where there is no indictment, conviction, or civil judgment, the SDO relies on her or his review of the
evidence received from others. 39
c) Suspension. Frequently, a contractor's first encounter
with the US government's debarment system results from the
receipt of a Notice of Suspension. Suspension under the FAR is a
mechanism that permits any agency to temporarily 40 exclude a
contractor for the duration of an agency's investigation or ensuing legal proceedings. 41 According to the FAR, suspension may be
"imposed on the basis of adequate evidence . . . when it has been

determined that immediate action is necessary to protect the
Government's interest."42 In other words, suspension is possible
where (1) the SDO finds adequate evidence-that is, information
sufficient to support the reasonable belief that a particular act or
omission has occurred 43-and (2) immediate action is necessary
to protect the Government's interest. In determining whether
adequate evidence exists, the agency considers "how much information is available, how credible it is given the circumstances,
whether or not important accusations are corroborated, and what
inferences can reasonably be drawn as a result."44 Such a determination should include the examination of documents such as
contracts, inspection reports, and correspondence. 45
3 For such causes, see 48 CFR § 9.406-2.
38 See Bednar, The Practitioner'sGuide at 63 (cited in note 13).
39 See id at 63-64.
40 Although the exact duration of a suspension is generally indeterminate and dependent on the length of the investigation, maximum duration restrictions apply. For a
discussion of these limits, see notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
41 See 48 CFR § 9.407-1(b)(1). For definition of legal proceedings, see 48 CFR § 9.403
("Legal proceedings means any civil judicial proceeding to which the Government is a
party or any criminal proceeding. The term includes appeals from such proceedings.").
42 48 CFR § 9.407-1(b)(1).
43 48 CFR § 2.101(b)(2).
44 48 CFR § 9.407-1(b)(1).
41 48 CFR § 9.407-1(b)(1).
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d) Notice. If an SDO suspends a contractor, the contractor is immediately advised by certified mail.4 6 The Notice of Suspension includes the following components:
(1)Notice that the contractor has "been suspended and that
the suspension is based on an indictment or other adequate
evidence that the contractor has committed irregularities (i)
of a serious nature in business dealings with the Government
or (ii) seriously reflecting on the propriety of further Government dealings with the contractor." The Notice describes any
such irregularities "in terms sufficient to place the contractor
on notice without disclosing the Government's evidence;"
(2)Notice "that the suspension is for a temporary period
pending the completion of an investigation and such legal
proceedings as may ensue;"
(3)A list of causes relied upon for imposing suspension;
(4) Notice "of the effect of the suspension;"
(5)Notice that, "within thirty days after receipt of the Notice,
the contractor may submit (in person, in writing, or through a
representative) information and arguments opposing the suspension;" and
(6)Indication that "additional proceedings to determine disputed material facts will be conducted 47 unless (i) the action
is based on an indictment or (ii) a determination is made, on
the basis of Department of Justice advice, that the substantial interests of the Government in pending or contemplated
legal proceedings based on the same facts as the suspension
would be prejudiced." 48
The FAR does not expressly require the suspending agency
to provide to a contractor the full administrative record upon
which an SDO's decision was based, but case law indicates that
compliance with requests for such information is required. In
46 48 CFR

§ 9.407-3(c).
47 These additional proceedings include the preparation of written findings of fact
upon which the suspending official bases his/her decision to modify or terminate the suspension, or leave it in force. See 48 CFR § 9.407-3(d)(2)(i), (d)(3).
48 48 CFR § 9.407-3(c).
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practice, agencies provide the administrative record in one of two
ways: either directly with the Notice of Suspension, or, to avoid
the administrative burden, only when requested by the respondent. 49 Individual, agency-specific regulations leave decisions regarding the process for providing the record to the SDO.
e) Effect and duration. When an SDO suspends a contractor, the agency publicly lists the name of the suspended party or
parties and the fact of the suspension on the General Services
Administration's (GSA) List of Parties Excluded from Federal
Procurement and Non-Procurement Programs (the "Excluded
Parties List System," or EPLS).50 Accordingly, the contractor and
any specifically named affiliates are excluded from receiving contracts, subcontracts, or new task orders on existing contracts,
and agencies may not solicit offers from such contractor. The
suspended contractor also cannot conduct business with the Government as an agent or representative of other contractors. 5 1
This suspension lasts for the period pending the completion of
the investigation and any ensuing legal proceedings. 52 However,
if legal proceedings are not initiated within twelve months after
the date of the suspension notice, the suspension automatically
terminates unless an Assistant Attorney General (AAG) requests
a six-month extension. In total, a suspension under the FAR may
last for not more than eighteen months before legal proceedings
have been commenced. 53 But once legal proceedings have commenced, a suspension may continue until the resolution of legal
proceedings, including appeals. 54

f)

Termination. An SDO has broad discretion in deciding
to terminate a suspension.55 Terminations are typically based on
one of four grounds. First, the SDO may terminate the suspension based on a contractor's submission in response to the initial
49 See Bednar, The Practitioner'sGuide at 75-76 & n 284 (cited in note 13).
50 48 CFR § 9.404. The EPLS is available online at https://www.epls.gov/ (visited Sept
10, 2012).
51 48 CFR § 9.405(a). See also notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
52 48 CFR § 9.407-4(a).
5 48 CFR § 9.407-4(b).
54 See Bednar, The Practitioner'sGuide at 90-91 (cited in note 13).
5s 48 CFR § 9.407-3(d)(3) ("Such a decision is "without prejudice to the subsequent
imposition of (i) suspension by any other agency or (ii) debarment by any agency."). See
also 48 CFR § 9.407-4(a) ("Suspension shall be for a temporary period . .. unless sooner
terminated by the suspending official or as provided in this subsection.").
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Notice of Suspension. Second, the SDO may find he or she must
lift the suspension (and remove the public listing from the EPLS)
as a matter of law, if no legal proceedings are initiated within
twelve months of the suspension notice and an AAG has not
submitted a request for extension.5 6 Third, the SDO possesses
the discretion to terminate a suspension based on the individual
facts of each case.57 Finally, the SDO must terminate the suspension upon the resolution of a legal proceeding, such as an acquittal or a conviction. Upon conviction (sentencing), the termination
of the suspension would generally be accompanied by a Notice of
Proposed Debarment based upon the conviction.5 8
2. Notice of proposed debarment.
If the contractor is not suspended, and hence, does not receive a Notice of Suspension, its first encounter with the US
Government's debarment system will be in the form of a Notice
of Proposed Debarment (NPD). The NPD:
(1)informs the recipient "that debarment is being considered;"
(2)provides notice of the conduct on which the proposed debarment is based;
(3)states the causes for the proposed debarment;
(4)explains that the contractor may submit, within thirty
days after receipt of the Notice, "information and arguments
in opposition to the proposed debarment;"
(5)informs the contractor of the "agency's procedures governing debarment decisionmaking;" and
(6)explains the effects of the issuance of the NPD and the
"potential effect of an actual debarment."5 9

56 48 CFR § 9.407-4(b). The suspending official is required to notify the Department
of Justice of the proposed termination at least thirty days prior to the expiration of the
twelve month period, thereby providing the Department an opportunity to request an
extension. 48 CFR § 9.407-4(c).
57 48 CFR § 9.407-4(a).
58 See Bednar, The Practitioner'sGuide at 91 (cited in note 13).
59 48 CFR § 9.406-3(c).
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The full administrative record may accompany the NPD,
but, more often, an agency will only provide the full administrative record upon request.60 If no suspension is in effect, the debarring official must render a decision within thirty working
days after the receipt of any information and arguments submitted by the contractor, but the debarring official may extend this
thirty-day period for good cause.6 '
3. Decision-making process.
a) Two-pronged inquiry. The SDO must first answer the
question of whether underlying misconduct has been established
under a "preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof. If not,
the inquiry ends there: the contractor, assuming there is no criminal conviction, cannot be debarred. 62 If, however, the SDO determines that misconduct has indeed been established, the burden of proof shifts to the contractor, which must then demonstrate present responsibility if it wishes to avoid debarment.6 3
The concept of present responsibility refers, in a broad sense, to a
contractor's ethical integrity. In an operational sense, however, it
focuses on the contractor's ability to perform without violation in
the future, given the context of past conduct and performance. 64
The existence of remedial measures or mitigating factors provided for under the FAR (cooperation, internal investigation, etc.)
bolsters the claim of present responsibility by the contractor.6 5
Stage 1: Misconduct Inquiry. The SDO must first determine
whether the alleged misconduct was committed by the requisite
standard of proof. If the answer is negative, the SDO will termi-

60 See Bednar, The Practitioner'sGuide at 75 n 284 (cited in note 13).

61 48 CFR § 9.406-3(d)(1).
62 48 CFR § 9.406-3(d)(3) ("In any action in which the proposed debarment is not
based upon a conviction or civil judgment, the cause for debarment must be established
by a preponderance of the evidence.").
63 48 CFR § 9.406-1(a)(10) ("[Ilf a cause for debarment exists, the contractor has the
burden of demonstrating . . . its present responsibility and that debarment is not necessary.").
64 See Ric Fiore, Presentation: Suspension & Debarment (Nov 3, 2011), online at
http://fedbar.org/Image-Library/Chapters/North-Alabama/FBA-11-03-11.ppt.aspx (visited
Sept 10, 2012). See also 48 CFR § 9.104-1; 48 CFR § 9.406-1(a); Defense FederalAcquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) and Procedures, Guidance, and Information (PGI),
Appendix H-Debarment and Suspension Procedures (1998), online at http://www.acq.
osd.mil/dpap/dars/dfars/html/current/appendix-h.htm (visited Sept 10, 2012).
65 See 48 CFR § 9.406-1(a).
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nate the proposed debarment. If, however, it is positive, the burden of proof shifts to the contractor.
Stage 2: Present Responsibility. At this stage, the contractor
bears the burden of demonstrating its present responsibility.
* If the burden is not met, the SDO will determine a period of debarment for the affected contractor that is appropriate given the goal of protecting government interests. 66 The FAR instructs the SDO to consider a series of
factors-from timely disclosure to institution of internal
ethics provisions-before arriving at the debarment decision. 67
* If the burden is almost met, the SDO will likely strongly consider an administrative agreement that includes
remedial measures to "close the gap" between a robust
showing of present responsibility and the contractor's actual situation. The administrative agreement will also
likely stipulate monitoring/verification measures to ensure compliance.68
If the debarring official determines that the
presently responsible and debarment will not be
debarring official must notify the contractor and
involved.6 9 Figure 2 below summarizes the process
ing present responsibility.

contractor is
imposed, the
any affiliates
for determin-

66 48 CFR § 9-406-4(a)(1) ("Debarment shall be for a period commensurate with the
seriousness of the cause(s)."). See also notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
67 See notes 74-79 and accompanying text. See also Bednar, The Practitioner'sGuide
at 92 (cited in note 13).
68 See Bednar, The Practitioner'sGuide at 83-84 (cited in note 13).
69 48 CFR § 9.406-3(e)(2).
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FIGURE 2. TYPICAL PROCESS OF INQUIRY BY AN
FAR SYSTEM
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SDO UNDER THE

No Debarment

No Debarment

b) Disputed issue of material fact. The FAR provides for
two types of meetings between a contractor and the SDO, and
these two meeting types are intended to protect the contractor's
due process rights. An informal fact-finding hearing is available
to contractors prior to the debarment decision. A contractor may
initially request to meet with the SDO and make an informal
oral submission, with or without counsel. If the SDO determines
that a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the contractor may
also request a fact-finding hearing. In the latter, the contractor
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has the opportunity to appear with counsel, submit documentary
evidence, and present and confront witnesses. Alternatively, the
contractor may simply make a documentary submission and receive the SDO's determination without an in-person hearing.70
One exception to this opportunity is debarment on the basis of an
existing conviction. In such cases, the hearing received prior to
the conviction "suffices for due process in the debarment proceeding."7 1
c) Determination of present responsibility. The existence
of a cause for debarment does not mandate debarment of the contractor. 72 Rather, this decision is made at the SDO's discretion.
The SDO may only suspend or debar a contractor if the imposition of debarment would further the public interest, because the
FAR does not permit debarments for purposes of punishment. 73
Accordingly-where there is a finding that the contractor committed the type of misconduct set forth in the FAR by the requisite standard of proof-the SDO must, before debarring the contractor, also determine whether the contractor has demonstrated
its present responsibility by considering various mitigating factors. 74
The mitigating factors provided for under the FAR include
the following: disciplinary action taken by the contractor against
the individual(s) responsible for the misconduct; institution or
improvement of a compliance program; payment for the improper
activity; cooperation with the respective agency, including voluntary disclosure; and internal investigation by the contractor of
the circumstances surrounding the misconduct.7 5 The SDO also
should consider factors such as: (1) "[w]hether the contractor had
effective standards of conduct and internal control systems in
place at the time of the activity, which constitutes cause for debarment, or had adopted such procedures prior to any Government investigation of the activity cited as a cause for debar70 48 CFR § 9.406-3(b).
71 Manuel, Debarment and Suspension of Gouernment Contractors at 7 & n 30 (cited
in note 17). See also Notices, Administrative Conference of the United States, Adoption of
Recommendations, 60 Fed Reg 13692, 13695, 13697 (1995).
72 48 CFR § 9.406-1(a).
7 48 CFR § 9.402(b) ("The serious nature of debarment and suspension requires that
these sanctions be imposed only in the public interest for the Government's protection
and not for purposes of punishment.").
74 48 CFR § 9.406-1(a),
5 See id.
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ment";76 (2) "[w]hether the contractor has implemented or agreed
to implement remedial measures";7 7 (3) "[w]hether the contractor
has had adequate time to eliminate the circumstances within the
contractor's organization that led to the cause for debarment"; 78
and (4) "[w]hether the contractor's management recognizes and
understands the seriousness of the misconduct giving rise to the
cause for debarment and has implemented programs to prevent
recurrence [s]."79
Consideration of the aforementioned mitigating factors is
mandatory under the FAR. Although the language of the FAR
states that "the debarring official should consider factors such
as" those listed above, at least one court has found that failure to
consider mitigating factors may provide a basis for overturning a
debarment because the FAR requires their consideration.8 0
4. SDO's debarment decision.
If, after considering the entire administrative record, the
SDO decides to debar the contractor, the official must notify the
contractor and any involved affiliates, referring to the NPD,
specifying the reasons for debarment, and stating the period of
debarment, including the effective dates.8 1 The official also must
advise the contractor that the debarment is "effective throughout
the executive branch of the Government unless the head of an
agency or a designee .. . state[s] in writing the compelling rea-

sons justifying continued business dealings between that agency
and the contractor." 82
C.

Period of Debarment

After an SDO decides to debar, he or she must determine the
period of debarment. A debarment must be for a fixed term that

76 48 CFR

§ 9.406-1(a)(1).
CFR § 9.406-1(a)(7).
CFR § 9.406-1(a)(9).
CFR § 9.406-1(a)(10).
CFR § 9.406-1(a). For a discussion of the case that found the failure to consider
mitigating factors a basis for overturning debarment, see Bednar, The Practitioner's
Guide at 82 & n 298 (cited in note 13), citing Silverman v Department of Defense, 817 F
Supp 846 (SD Cal 1993).
81 48 CFR § 9.406-3(e)(1)(i)-(iii).
82 48 CFR §§ 9.406-1(c), 9.406-3(e)(1)(iv). See also notes 92-93 and accompanying
text.
7

48
78 48
7 48
80 48
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is commensurate with the seriousness of the violation(s).8 3 Generally, this means that debarment should not exceed three years,
except in certain situations like debarment for violation of the
Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, which allows for a five-year
debarment term. 84
The SDO must always consider the "time served," meaning
the period of suspension and proposed debarment, if applicable,
in determining the time period of the affected contractor's ineligibility. 85 The requirement of such consideration does not necessitate that agencies give credit for those pre-debarment periods
(although some may well do just that), but, at a minimum, that
agencies take this fact into account during determination of the
term of debarment. After the imposition of the debarment, the
FAR permits the SDO to reduce the period or extent of debarment for "(1) [n]ewly discovered material evidence; (2) [r]eversal
of the conviction or civil judgment upon which the debarment
was based; (3) [blona fide change in ownership or management;
(4) [e]limination of other causes for which the debarment was
imposed; or (5) [o]ther reasons the debarring official deems appropriate."86 Consideration of these factors is not prescribed, but
is conditioned upon the contractor's request and supporting documentation.8 7
D.

Effects of Suspension or Debarment

A person or entity that is debarred, suspended, or proposed
for debarment under the FAR is prohibited from receiving federal executive branch contracts-including new task orders on existing contracts-and certain subcontracts, and from participating in certain types of federal assistance programs.8 8 Although
existing contracts with the affected agency are permitted to con§ 9.406-4(a)(1).
84 48 CFR § 9.406-4(a)(1). The term "generally," which appears in the text of the
regulation, has been interpreted as giving implied authority to impose a period either
more or less than the stated three years. See, for example, Bednar, Thd Practitioner's
Guide at 92 (cited in note 13).
85 48 CFR § 9.406-4(a)(2).
86 48 CFR § 9.406-4(c). In practice, the language of § 9.406-4(c)(5) ("other reasons")
has been interpreted to include the mitigating factors enumerated in § 9.406-1(a). Section 9.406-1(a) states that "mitigating factors should be considered in making any debarment decision," which could plausibly include the length of the debarment period. 48 CFR
§ 9.406-(1)(a) (emphasis added).
87 48 CFR § 9.406-4(c).
83 48 CFR

8 48 CFR

§ 9.405(a);

54 Fed Reg at 34131 (cited in note 21).
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tinue under the FAR, some agencies discourage placement of
new task orders under existing contracts that do not contain
quantity restrictions.89 Such contractors are also excluded from
conducting business with the government as agents or representatives of other contractors. Agencies are, in turn, prohibited
from soliciting offers from contractors that have been debarred,
suspended, or proposed for debarment, without a compelling reason for such action.9 0
The debarments and suspensions imposed under the FAR
are prospective, and thus, an agency may generally allow the
contractor to continue performance under any current contracts
or subcontracts unless the agency head makes a different determination.9 1 In addition, the FAR authorizes agencies to waive a
contractor's exclusion and enter into new contracts with that
suspended or debarred contractor if there is a "compelling reason" to do so. 9 2 The FAR itself does not define the term "compelling reason," but the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement provides that compelling reasons include the following:
* a lack of alternative contractors;
* urgency;
* an existing agreement between the contractor and the
agency, covering the same events that resulted in the debarment or suspension and including the agency's decision not to
debar/suspend the contractor; or,
* the requirements of national defense. 93
Figure 3 below summarizes the consequences of suspension
and debarment under the FAR.

89 Bednar, The Practitioner'sGuide at 133 (cited in note 13).
90 48 CFR § 9.405(a). See also 48 CFR §§ 9.402(a), 9.404(c)(7).
91 48 CFR § 9.405-1(a). See also Manuel, Debarment and Suspension of Government
Contractorsat 10 (cited in note 17).
92 48 CFR § 9.405(a). A 2005 report issued by the Government Accountability Office
noted that "two of the agencies [it] reviewed in depth-the Air Force and the Army-[had]
issued compelling reason waivers to continue doing business with excluded parties." William T. Woods, Federal Procurement:Additional Data Reporting Could Improve the Suspension and Debarment Process, GAO-05-479 at "Highlights" (GAO July 2005), online at
http://www.gao.govinew.items/d05479.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012).
9 48 CFR § 209.405(a).
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FIGURE 3. SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT UNDER THE FAR

*Effect: contractor ineligible to do business with US
government
eTerm: temporary period pending completion of ongoing
investigation

*Causes: a serious violation of a govt contract or other
misconduct that indicates a lack of business
integrity/honesty, or that is so serious/of compelling a nature
that it affects a contractor's present responsibility
*Standard of proof: "adequate evidence"

*Effect: contractor ineligible to do business with US
government
*Term: specific period

*Causes: a serious violation of a govt contract or other
misconduct that indicates a lack of business
integrity/honesty, or that is so serious/of compelling a nature
that it affects a contractor's present responsibility
*Standard of proof: "preponderance of the evidence"
Additionally, in some cases, letters terminating suspension

and debarment proceedings or pre-exclusion Notices by the agency may also serve to communicate the agency's concern or obser-

vations to the contractor.
E.

Judicial Review

A contractor may appeal an SDO's decision by seeking judicial review of the debarment decision in a federal court. Most
often, a contractor will request review under the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA).94 Under the APA, a court may reverse an
SDO's decision only where it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law ."95 Generally,

the SDO's decision will be upheld where there is a "rational connection between the facts found and the choice made."96
94 See Bednar, The Practitioner'sGuide at 94, 177 (cited in note 13).

95 5USC § 706(2)(A).
96 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc v United States, 966 F2d 1292, 1297 (9th

Cir 1992).
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Administrative Agreements

Executive agencies may employ administrative agreements
as alternatives to debarment and suspension even though the
FAR does not present them as a specific option for the SDO. 9 7
However, the Government Accountability Office has recommended that, before entering into these agreements with a contractor,
the SDO should determine whether another federal agency had a
similar agreement with that contractor, the terms of such an
agreement, and whether the contractor complied with its obligations as outlined in the agreement.9 8
Administrative agreements generally last for three years
and include an admission of wrongful conduct by the contractor
as well as a listing of the remedial measures that led to the present responsibility determination 9 9 Such remedial measures
may include restitution, removal, or isolation of the wrongdoer,
implementation of an ethics or compliance program, outside auditing, and agency access to contractor records.10 0 For example,
some typical administrative agreements entered into by the US
Air Force SDO contain provisions requiring the contractor (1) to
"engage an outside consultant ...

to perform two reviews of the

contractor's business standards program" both pre- and postagreement and (2) to "submit periodic reports to the [agency] in
which extensive information is provided about the operation of
the contractor's business."1 0 1 The execution of such an agreement
generally terminates the suspension or proposed debarment.102
In some instances, administrative agreements also include
the use of an independent monitor that reports directly to the
government on the company's adherence to the agreement's
terms, as well as its overall compliance. As such, the administra9" See Manuel, Debarment and Suspension of Government Contractors at 9 (cited in
note 17).
98 See Woods, Federal Procurement at 17 (cited in note 92); Paul Denett and Linda
Combs, Memorandum to the Heads of Departments and Agencies, M-06-26 (Office of Management and Budget Aug 31, 2006), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/omb/assets/omb/memorandalfy2006/m06-26.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012).
9 Bednar, The Practitioner'sGuide at 83 (cited in note 13). Contractors are advised
to contact the agency early in the suspension or debarment process to explore the possibility of resolving an existing or potential proceeding via an administrative agreement. Id
at 84.
1oo See id at 83-84; Manuel, Debarment and Suspension of Government Contractorsat
9 (cited in note 17).
101 Shaw, Suspension and Debarment at 7 (cited in note 19).
102 See Bednar, The Practitioner'sGuide at 83 (cited in note 13).
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tive agreement option and the breadth of provisions that it enables provide a toolkit for the lead agency to address the alleged
misconduct.
In 2006, the Office of Management and Budget instructed
agency officials to share administrative agreements with the
ISDC.103 More recent reports referred to the database of contractor responsibility information that includes administrative
agreements. A new system ensuring ready availability of information regarding administrative agreements has been in use
since 2011.104
II. THE WORLD BANK

A.

Background

The Bank is an international financial institution providing
low-interest loans, interest-free credits, and grants to developing
countries for a multitude of purposes. In its 2011 fiscal year, the
World Bank Group committed US$57.3 billion in loans, grants,
equity investments, and guarantees to its members and to private businesses.10 5 Much like the US government, the Bank has
an interest in ensuring that its funds are used appropriately.
Indeed, under its Articles of Agreement, the Bank has a fiduciary
duty to ensure that proceeds of its financing are used for their
intended purposes and with due attention to economy and efficiency.10 6 Accordingly, the Bank has established a sanctions system to help prevent and combat fraud and corruption-two of the
103 See Denett and Combs, Memorandum to the Heads of Departments and Agencies
(cited in note 98).
104 See Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009
§ 872, Pub L No 110-417, 122 Stat 4356, 4555 (2008), codified at 41 USC § 2313 (formerly
41 USC § 417b). This codification has since been included in the FAR. See 48 CFR
§ 9.406-3(f). The system established by this legislation is available online at http://www
.fapiis.gov/ (visited Sept 10, 2012). See also How Convicts and Con Artists Receive New
Federal Contracts, Hearing before House Committee on Oversight and Govt Reform,
111th Cong, 1st Sess 125 (2009) (statement of Scott Amey, General Counsel, Project on
Government Oversight).
105 See Robert B. Zoellick, Message From the President of the World Bank Group and
Chairmanof the Board of Executive Directors,The World Bank Annual Report 2011: Year
in Review Cover 4 (The World Bank 2011), online at http://siteresources.worldbank.
org/EXTANNREP2011/Resources/8070616-1315496634380/WBAR11_YearInReview.pdf
(visited Sept 10, 2012).
106 See The World Bank Group, The World Bank Group's Sanctions Regime: Information Note, 3 (World Bank 2011), online at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOFF
EVASUSIResources/TheWorld_BankGroupSanctions Regime.pdf (visited Sept 10,
2012).
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greatest obstacles to economic and social development-in Bank
projects and programs.10 7 This system seeks to uphold the Bank's
fiduciary duty by excluding certain actors from access to Bank
financing, by deterring misconduct, and by incentivizing rehabilitation. More broadly, the Bank hopes that the sanctions system
furthers a global disincentive for the types of behavior it seeks to
curb and prevent.108

B.

Sanctionable Practices

The Bank's sanctions system is a quasi-judicial administrative process that provides the accused party (respondent) with
procedural protections to ensure basic fairness before any decision is reached as to what misconduct has occurred and, if so,
what sanction is appropriate.109 Under this process, a respondent
may be sanctioned for engaging in fraud, corruption, collusion,
coercion, or obstructive practices (collectively known as "sanctionable practices") in the procurement or execution of Bankfinanced contracts.1 10
Causes for debarment within the Bank's system are not as
extensive as those under the FAR. Specifically, the Bank's system relates to fraudulent, corrupt, collusive, and coercive practices in both the procurement and execution of Bank-financed
contracts. Criminal convictions or civil judgments are not includ107 See id. Contracts for goods and non-consulting services financed in whole or in part
by the Bank are subject to the rules found in the Bank's Guidelines: Procurement of
Goods, Works and Non-Consulting Services under IBRD and IDA Credits & Grants ("the
Procurement Guidelines"). The policies and procedures for selecting, contracting, and
monitoring consultants required for projects financed in whole or in part by the Bank are
found in the Bank's Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants under IBRD
Loans & IDA Credits & Grants by World Bank Borrowers ("the Consultant Guidelines").
Both the Procurement and Consultant Guidelines contain provisions prohibiting contractors from engaging in "sanctionable practices." The Bank has also established guidelines
designed to prevent and combat fraud and corruption that may occur during the preparation and/or implementation of IBRD- or IDA-financed investment projects ("the AntiCorruption Guidelines"). See id at 4 n 6, 12-13, 17-19. For access to the Guidelines, see
The World Bank, Key and Reference Documents, online at http://go.worldbank.org/CV
UUIS7HZO (visited Sept 10, 2012).
1os The World Bank Group, World Bank Sanctioning Guidelines *1, online at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/WorldBankSanctioningG
uidelines.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012). See also The World Bank Group, World Bank Sanctions Procedures § 1.01(a) at 1 (World Bank Jan 1, 2011), online at http://siteresources.
(visworldbank.org/EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/WBGSanctionsProceduresJan20l1.pdf
ited Sept 10, 2012); World Bank, Information Note at 4 (cited in note 106).
109 World Bank, InformationNote at 3 (cited in note 106).
110 World Bank, Sanctions Procedures at Appendix 1 (cited in note 108).
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ed as distinct causes for sanctioning by the Bank. Poor but nonfraudulent contract performance, in and of itself, is likewise not
grounds for sanction. However, the Bank considers sanctionable
any conduct that is obstructive to a World Bank investigation."
Sanctions Process

C.

Figure 4 below provides a summary of the World Bank Sanctions System.
FIGURE 4. SUMMARY OF WORLD BANK SANCTIONS SYSTEM STAGES

PreSan
SAE
Investigatio
(Possible)

EarlyV
Temporary
Suspension

Investigative
Assessment

Submission

Proceedings

1. Investigation.
The Bank's Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) receives numerous complaints and referrals, many of which are submitted by
those involved in activities supported by Bank funds, including
Bank staff. Referrals can be made via direct submissions to INT
or by calling an anonymous hotline.112 INT performs an initial
assessment of every complaint that it receives "to determine
whether the complaint relates to a sanctionable practice ...
whether the complaint has credibility, and whether the matter is
111 See id. The Bank defines "Sanctionable Practices" to include "Obstructive practice,"
and defines "Obstructive practice" as,
i) deliberately destroying, falsifying, altering or concealing of evidence material
to the investigation or making false statements to investigators in order to materially impede a Bank investigation into allegations of a corrupt, fraudulent,
coercive or collusive practice; andlor threatening, harassing or intimidating any
party to prevent it from disclosing its knowledge of matters relevant to the investigation or from pursuing the investigation, or (ii) acts intended to materially impede the exercise of the Bank's contractual rights of audit or access to information.
Id.
112 The World Bank Group, Integrity Vice Presidency:Annual Report: Fiscal 2010, 26,
36 (World Bank 2010), online at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/
588889-1286308793420/WBG IntegrityReport2Ol0 finalLO-RES.pdf (visited Sept 10,
2012). See also The Investigative Process (World Bank Feb 21, 2012), online at http://go.
worldbank.org/Y43I9YDP10 (visited Sept 10, 2012).
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of sufficient gravity to warrant an investigation."1 3 Assuming
that the accusation falls under INT's jurisdiction," 4 INT commences an investigation to develop an evidentiary record of
whether the firm or individual has engaged in a sanctionable
practice. During the course of the investigation, INT may, under
certain circumstances, seek to temporarily suspend the firm or
individual under investigation via a special mechanism known as
Early Temporary Suspension (ETS)." 5
The Bank's sanctions process therefore begins in much the
same manner as it does under the FAR, although the Bank's
more limited list of causes for debarment means that there may
be somewhat fewer channels for submission of information. (For
example, as noted above, criminal or civil judgments do not by
themselves give rise to a cause for debarment.) Also, INT does
not encounter the issue of lead agency determination found in
the domestic US context because INT possesses exclusive authority to investigate fraud and corruption involving Bank-financed
contracts.
2. Early temporary suspension.
Before concluding an investigation, INT may believe that
sufficient evidence already exists to support a finding that a respondent engaged in a sanctionable practice and that it is highly
likely that the investigation will be successfully concluded and a
Statement of Accusations and Evidence (SAE) will be presented
to the Evaluation and Suspension Officer (EO) within one year.
In such cases, INT may seek an ETS from Bank-financed contracts by submitting a Request for Temporary Suspension (RTS)
to the EO.116
113 World Bank, Integrity Vice Presidency:Annual Report at 26 (cited in note 112).
1" INT's investigative mandate focuses on sanctionable practices engaged in by recipients of World Bank funds. With respect to officials within the member state governments, it nevertheless has been the Bank's long-standing policy not to sanction governments or government officials. The rationale for this policy lies in the cooperative structure of the Bank, respect for the sovereignty of its Member, and the fact that alternative
means are available to address these cases, in particular the Borrower's obligation to take
timely and appropriate action and the Bank's ability to exercise contractual remedies in
the event that the Borrower fails to do so. However, this exemption is functional in nature. "To the extent that a government official engages in a Sanctionable Practice in his
or her private capacity, the exemption does not apply and the official is subject to sanction." World Bank, Information Note at 19-20 (cited in note 106). See also World Bank,
SanctioningGuidelines at *1 (cited in note 108).
115 World Bank, Information Note at 4 (cited in note 106).
116 See World Bank, Sanctions Procedures§ 2.01(a) at 7 (cited in note 108). The World
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After receiving this request, the relevant EO may impose a
temporary suspension on the subject of the INT investigation
prior to the commencement of formal sanctions proceedings if the
EO finds that there is sufficient evidence that the firm or individual has engaged in at least one sanctionable practice and
that, had the accusations been included in an SAE, the EO would
have recommended a sanction of debarment for at least two
years. 117 In determining whether sufficient evidence exists, the
EO considers the information contained in the RTS drafted by
INT and the accompanying evidence.
a) Notice. If the EO decides to apply an ETS, the EO issues a Notice of Temporary Suspension (NTS) to the respondent
and notifies the Chair of the World Bank Sanctions Board
("Sanctions Board") and INT.118 The NTS contains the following
information: (1) notification of the respondent's ETS and the procedure by which the respondent may provide a Preliminary Explanation, 119 and (2) the RTS and the accompanying evidence
submitted by INT, together with copies of the current Sanctions
Procedures and the Sanctions Board Statute. 120
b) Effect and duration. Upon issuance of the NTS by the
EO, the respondent is temporarily suspended from eligibility for
contracts for Bank-financed projects and cannot otherwise participate in new activities in connection with Bank projects. 12 1 The
initial duration of an ETS is six months, but INT may request an
additional six-month extension no later than five months after
Bank Group has four EOs--one for each of (i) the World Bank (IBRD/IDA), (ii) IFC, (ii)
MIGA, and (iv) Partial Risk Guarantees (PRGs). See note 4.
117 World Bank, Sanctions Procedures § 2.01(c) at 7-8 (cited in note 108). The term
"sufficient evidence" means "evidence sufficient to support a reasonable belief, taking into
consideration all relevant factors and circumstances, that it is more likely than not that
the respondent has engaged in a Sanctionable Practice." Id § 1.02(a) at 5.
118 Id § 2.01(c) at 7-8. The EO may decide to withhold evidence if INT shows that
"there is a reasonable basis to conclude that (i) the disclosure of such evidence would have
a material adverse effect on the investigation, and (ii) the [r]espondent would retain the
ability to mount a meaningful response to the accusations against it notwithstanding the
withholding of such evidence." Id § 2.01(d) at 8.
119 A Preliminary Explanation is distinct from the Explanation (see Part IIB4a) in
that the former may be submitted in response to a Notice of Temporary Suspension,
whereas the latter may be submitted following the Respondent's receipt of the SAE (see
Part IB3).
120 World Bank, Sanctions Procedures §§ 2.01(b), 4.01(b)(ii)-(iv) at 7, 11-12 (cited in
note 108).
121 Id § 2.03 at 8-9.
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the commencement of the temporary suspension.122 The fact that
a respondent has been temporarily suspended is shared with certain personnel of the Bank's member countries via a limitedaccess website.
c) Termination. An ETS may be terminated under three
scenarios. First, the EO may decide to terminate the suspension
upon review of a Preliminary Explanation submitted by the respondent within thirty days after the issuance of the NTS. 123 Second, the EO may terminate the temporary suspension at any
time upon a finding that there was a manifest error in the NTS
or other clear basis for termination. 124 Finally, if INT does not
submit an SAE to the EO prior to the end of the period of temporary suspension, the suspension automatically expires. 125
The ETS mechanism under the Bank's procedures functions
much like suspension under the US system, as it permits the
Bank to temporarily suspend a respondent during the course of
an investigation. Further, the contents of the Notice of Suspension under the FAR in some ways mirror those of the NTS under
the Bank's sanctions system. In each case, the recipient is informed of the suspension, the basis for the suspension, its duration and effect, the procedures by which the contractor may contest the suspension and/or submit explanatory materials, and the
additional proceedings that may occur following the suspension.
But the Bank's ETS process differs somewhat from the FAR
suspension process in terms of additional procedures, information transmitted to a respondent, the suspension's publicization and duration, and termination options. First, the Bank's
procedures do not provide a respondent with the opportunity to
request a hearing regarding the EO's imposition of an ETS.12 6
Rather, the respondent may only submit a Preliminary Explanation upon which the EO may decide to terminate the ETS. In
contrast, under the FAR, if a contractor's response to the Notice
of Suspension raises a genuine dispute over material facts, addi§ 2.04(a) at 9.
Id §§ 2.02-2.03 at 8-9.
World Bank, Sanctions Procedures § 2.04(d) at 9-10 (cited in note 108).
Id § 2.04(c) at 9.
Of course, when the EO temporarily suspends a respondent or continues an early
temporary suspension already imposed because the EO has issued a Notice of Sanctions
Proceedings to that respondent, the respondent has an opportunity to contest the matter
to the World Bank's Sanctions Board. See notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
122 Id

123
124
125
126
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tional proceedings are conducted unless either of two limited exceptions applies. 127 As mentioned above, additional proceedings
under the FAR include the preparation of written findings of fact
upon which the suspending official bases his or her decision to
modify or terminate the suspension or to leave it in force. 128
Moreover, in terms of information transmitted to a respondent, the Bank's procedures require the EO to send all information that he or she reviewed to the respondent, subject to the
limited exception noted above. In contrast, the FAR does not explicitly require the suspending agency to disclose the entire administrative record supporting a suspension. However, the FAR
has been found to require this through developed case law; as a
result, the administrative record is regularly shared, either upon
the contractor's request or via inclusion with the Notice of Suspension. 129
Third, the Bank's ETS differs from the FAR's suspension in
terms of publicity, minimum duration, and maximum duration.
In terms of publicity, the Bank disseminates the names of suspended respondents via a controlled-access website to its member countries, whereas the GSA publicly lists the fact of each
suspension 30 and identifies the suspended entity or individual
on the EPLS. Additionally, the Bank's rules stipulate a minimum
period of six months for the duration of the suspension while the
FAR does not provide a fixed minimum. Finally, the FAR and the
Bank's procedures diverge on the maximum time period allowed
for suspension. While the Bank's procedures provide for a maximum period of twelve months without the submission of an SAE,
the FAR allows a suspension to last twelve months (extendable
by an additional six months, for a total of eighteen months) without the initiation of legal proceedings. Once legal proceedings are
initiated, there is no longer a time limit on the length of a suspension. 13 1

127 See note 47 and accompanying text.
128 See note 71 and accompanying text.
129 See generally Todd J. Canni, Shoot First, Ask Questions Later: An Examination
and Critique of Suspension and Debarment Practice Under the FAR, Including a Discussion of the Mandatory Disclosure Rule, the IBM Suspension, and Other Noteworthy Developments, 38 Pub Contract L J 547, 573 (2009) ("Due process requires a sufficiently detailed Notice of suspension.").
130 This listing does not, however, include the suspension decision itself.
131 See notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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A final difference between the Bank's ETS mechanism and
the FAR's suspension pertains to the various options under
which a suspension or ETS may be terminated. Grounds for termination of an ETS under the Bank's sanctions system are explicit but limited. Unlike the Bank's procedures, the FAR does
not explicitly allow for the termination of suspension based on
manifest error or any other clear basis, but the suspending official possesses the discretion to terminate a suspension at any
time. 132 Figure 5 below summarizes the procedural differences
between the FAR and the World Bank ETS Mechanism.
FIGURE 5. COMPARISON OF SUSPENSION UNDER THE FAR AND THE
WORLD BANK ETS MECHANISM
*-

s

*

World Bank ETS Mechanism

- FA

Makes contractor ineligible during
investigation and suspension

Makes contractor ineligible during
investigation and suspension

I

Contractor formally notified of
suspension and investigation

Contractor formally notified of
suspension and investigation

I

I

Contractor may request meeting;
hearing possible where genuine
issue of material fact

I

Contractor may request
administrative record of case.

Contractor may submit Preliminary
Explanation only

I

Contractor provided with RTS and INT
evidence.

Fact of suspension shared via
public listing

Fact of suspension shared with
certain personnel of member
countries via extranet

Duration: 0-18 months

Duration: 6-12 months

Termination is at SDO's discretion

Termination may take place according
to Sanctions Procedures (3 scenarios)

132

See notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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3. Submission of a Statement of Accusations and Evidence
(SAE).
After concluding its investigation, if INT believes sufficient
evidence exists that a firm or individual engaged in one or more
sanctionable practices, INT may seek to initiate sanctions proceedings by submitting an SAE to the relevant EO. 13 3
The SAE must contain:
(i) INT's specific accusations of Sanctionable Practices; (ii)
INT's designation of each [r]espondent alleged to have engaged in such practices ... ; (iii) INT's summary of the
facts constituting the Sanctionable Practice . .. ; and (iv)

the evidence in support of its accusations, together with
any exculpatory or mitigating evidence.1 34
4. Sanctions proceedings.
The World Bank's sanctions system can be described as a
"two-tier process"-in recognition of the two levels of review afforded to the accusations and evidence behind every SAE. At the
first tier, the EO reviews the accusations and evidence and,
where he or she finds the evidence sufficient, recommends a
sanction that will be imposed in the absence of an appeal. If the
respondent does subsequently contest the accusations and/or recommended sanction, the matter enters a second tier of review,
conducted by the World Bank Group's Sanctions Board.
a) EO review. When INT submits an SAE to the EO, the
EO evaluates whether the evidence presented by INT is sufficient to support a finding of sanctionable practice. 135 If the EO
determines that sufficient evidence supports INT's accusations in
the SAE, he or she issues a Notice of Sanctions Proceedings ("the
Notice"), recommends an appropriate sanction, and, if applicable,
133 World Bank, Sanctions Procedures§ 3.01 at 10-11 (cited in note 108).

1

Id

§ 3.01(b)
§4.01(a)

at 10-11.
at 11. If the SAE pertains to a sanctionable practice in connection with
a contract the execution of which was completed more than ten years prior to date on
which INT submits the SAE to the EO and the case is brought under the Bank's Procurement or Consultant Guidelines, the EO must close the matter. For all other cases,
including those brought under the Anti-Corruption Guidelines and cases involving obstructive practices, the EO also must close the matter if the sanctionable practice took
place more than ten years prior to the date on which INT submitted the SAE to the EO.
Id § 4.01(d) at 12-13.
135 Id
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temporarily suspends the respondent from eligibility for Bankfinanced contracts. A respondent will be temporarily suspended
upon issuance of the Notice only where the EO recommends a
sanction including a minimum period of debarment exceeding six

months.136
The Notice includes the following information: (1) the recommended sanction(s); (2) if applicable, notification of the respondent's temporary suspension; (3) the procedure by which the
respondent may submit an Explanation to the EO; (4) the manner in which the respondent may contest (to the Sanctions
Board) the accusations and/or the recommended sanction in the
Notice; and (5) INT's SAE and the accompanying evidence, together with copies of the current Sanctions Procedures and the
Sanctions Board Statute, in effect at the time of issuance of the
Notice. 137 If the EO temporarily suspends a respondent, a notification of such suspension will be posted on a limited-access website. 138
Within thirty days of receipt of the Notice, the respondent
may file an "Explanation" with the EO seeking either dismissal
of the case or a revision to the recommended sanction.139 Upon
reviewing the Explanation, the EO may withdraw the Notice (also simultaneously terminating the temporary suspension) or revise the recommended sanction.140 Within ninety days of receipt
of the Notice, the respondent may contest the case by submitting
to the Sanctions Board a "Response," including written arguments and evidence.14 1 If the respondent does not contest the accusations or the EO's recommended sanction within ninety days
of delivery of the Notice, the sanction recommended by the EO is
imposed.142 In this case, the EO notifies the respondent, and the
full text of the EO's uncontested determination is publicly disclosed.143
136 Id §§ 4.01(a), 4.01(c), 4.02(a), 4.02(c) at 11-14. For an overview of the "considerations ... relevant to any sanctioning decision," see World Bank, Sanctioning Guidelines
(cited in note 108).
13 World Bank, Sanctions Procedures § 4.01(b) at 11-12 (cited in note 108).
138 Id § 4.02(e) at 14.
'39 Id § 4.02(b) at 13-14.
140 Id §§ 4.03(a), 4.02(c) at 14.
141 World Bank, Sanctions Procedures § 5.01(a) at 15-16 (cited in note 108). No more
than thirty days after a respondent submits a Response, INT may submit to the Sanctions Board a Reply to the arguments contained in the Response. Id § 5.01(b) at 16.
142 Id § 4.04 at 15.
143 Id §§ 4.04, 10.01(b) at 15, 30.
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b) Sanctions Board review. If, by submitting a Response,
the respondent contests the accusations made by INT andlor the
sanction recommended by the EO, the case is referred to the
Sanctions Board, the second and final tier in the sanctions process. The Sanctions Board meets several times a year to decide
cases presented on appeal and is composed of three Bank staff
members and four non-Bank staff members, one of whom is the
Chair. 144 Where requested by the respondent or INT, the Sanctions Board also holds a hearing on the matter.1 45
The Sanctions Board conducts a de novo review by considering the accusations and evidence contained in the Notice, the
arguments and evidence submitted by the respondent in the Explanation and Response, INT's Reply brief, the parties' presentations at a hearing, if applicable, and any other materials contained in the record.146 After completing its review, the Sanctions
Board determines whether it is more likely than not that the respondent engaged in a sanctionable practice. If insufficient evidence exists, the proceedings will be terminated. If the evidence
supports a finding that the respondent engaged in a sanctionable
practice, the Sanctions Board will impose an appropriate sanction. 147 In making these determinations, the Sanctions Board is
not bound by the EO's prior recommendation. 148 Decisions by the
Sanctions Board are final and cannot be appealed. 149
The two-tier sanctions proceeding phase of the Bank's process can be similar to the FAR's Notice of Proposed Debarment
phase in that the Notice and the NPD largely serve the same
purpose-namely, notifying the respondent or contractor of a
potential sanction or debarment, respectively. Moreover, both
systems provide for additional proceedings after the contractor/respondent has submitted a response to the Notice. However,
144 See The World Bank Group Sanctions Board, Law Digest, 17, 19 (World Bank
2011), online at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/LawDige
st2011WebVersion.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012). The Sanctions Board was fully constituted
and began hearing cases in 2007. The Sanctions Board has issued forty-five decisions
from 2007 through October 31, 2011. Id at 18, 21.
145 See World Bank, Sanctions Procedures § 6.01 at 19 (cited in note 108). The request
for a hearing must be made in the respondent's Response or INT's Reply. Id.
146 Id § 8.02(a) at 22. See also World Bank Group Sanctions Board, Law Digest at 1920 (cited in note 144).
147 World Bank, Sanctions Procedures §8.01 at 21-22 (cited in note 108).
148 Id.
149 Id

§ 8.03(a) at 23.
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the FAR's additional hearings are triggered only where the respondent/contractor's response to the NPD raises a genuine dispute over the material facts. On the other hand, a respondent
may avail itself of a Sanctions Board hearing under the Bank's
procedures upon request, regardless of whether a dispute regarding material facts exists. The Bank's sanctions proceedings also
differ from the FAR's NPD phase in terms of the information
provided to a contractor/respondent. As with the Early Temporary Suspension procedure discussed above, the Bank automatically sends all evidence to the respondent. The FAR does not explicitly require disclosure of the administrative record at the
NPD stage, but it is regularly shared with contractors, in the
same way as with the suspension procedure.15 0
Another distinction between the Bank's procedures and
those of the FAR pertains to disclosure. As mentioned above in
the context of ETS, when the EO temporarily suspends a respondent, a notice is posted on a limited-access website.' 5 ' But,
under the FAR, when a contractor is proposed for debarment, the
contractor is publicly listed on the EPLS.152
D.

Types of Sanctions

When the Sanctions Board or the EO (in an uncontested
case) determines that a respondent has engaged in sanctionable
practices, the Sanctions Board or the EO may choose from a
range of five possible sanctions: (1) debarment with conditional
release, (2) debarment for an indefinite or fixed term, (3) conditional non-debarment, (4) public letter of reprimand, and (5) restitution.153 The Sanctioning Guidelines provide that the baseline
sanction is debarment with conditional release with a minimum
period of debarment of three years. 154 During the period of debarment, the respondent is not eligible to be awarded Bankfinanced contracts, receive the proceeds of Bank loans, or other-

150 See Canni, Shoot First,Ask Questions Later, 38 Pub Contract L J at 573 (cited in
note 129).
151 This refers to the Bank's Client Connection extranet, which is a system that is
accessible by a limited audience within the governments of the Bank's client countries.
152 See note 50 and accompanying text.
153 World Bank, Sanctions Procedures § 9.01 at 23-25 (cited in note 108). See also
World Bank, SanctioningGuidelines at *1-2 (cited in note 108).
154 World Bank, Sanctioning Guidelines at *1 (cited in note 108).
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wise participate in the preparation or implementation of Bank
programs.1 5 5
Though debarment with conditional release with a minimum
period of debarment for three years is the baseline sanction, aggravating and mitigating factors may justify a different length or
type of sanction. The following aggravating factors may increase
the debarment term or favor a more stringent type of sanction:
(1) the severity of the misconduct, (2) the magnitude of harm
caused by the misconduct, (3) interference by the sanctioned party with the investigation, and (4) the sanctioned party's past history of adjudicated misconduct. 156 Conversely, the following mitigating factors may decrease the debarment term or favor a less
stringent sanction: (1) minor role in misconduct; (2) voluntary
corrective action taken, such as cessation of misconduct, internal
action against the responsible individual, implementation or improvement of a corporate compliance program, or restitution; and
(3) cooperation with the investigation including, but not limited
to, assistance andlor ongoing cooperation, conducting an internal
investigation, admission or acceptance of guilt or responsibility,
or voluntary restraint from bidding on Bank-financed tenders. 5 7
The Sanctions Board or the EO may also consider the period of
temporary suspension already served by the sanctioned party, a
sanctioned party's breach of the confidentiality of the sanctions
proceedings, and any other factor the Sanctions Board or the EO
deems relevant in relation to the sanctionable practice.1 58
The World Bank's Sanctioning Guidelines are "intended to
provide predictability and consistency while ensuring that both
the EO and the Sanctions Board retain the ability to reflect the
unique circumstances of each particular case" in the sanctions
they impose.15 9 As such, the Sanctioning Guidelines provide examples of situations in which deviation from the baseline sanction may be appropriate, including the following: where conditionality would not serve any reasonable purpose, a fixed term of
debarment may be appropriate; where it is unreasonable to conclude that a respondent can be rehabilitated through compliance
155 World Bank, Sanctions Procedures § 9.01(c) at 24 (cited in note 108).
156 Id § 9.02 at 25-26. See also World Bank, Sanctioning Guidelines at *3-4 (cited in
note 108).
157 World Bank, Sanctioning Guidelines at *4-5 (cited in note 108). See also World
Bank, Sanctions Procedures § 9.02(e) at 25 (cited in note 108).
158 World Bank, Sanctions Procedures § 9.02(f)-(i) at 25-26 (cited in note 108).
159 World Bank, InformationNote at 6 (cited in note 106).
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or other conditionalities, indefinite debarment may be warranted; where a respondent already has taken comprehensive corrective measures and other mitigating factors apply so as to justify
non-debarment, conditional non-debarment may be applied; and
in exceptional circumstances, where a quantifiable amount of
money can be restored to the client country or project, restitution
may be used. 60
Here, the Bank's procedures are similar to their counterparts under the FAR, in that the mitigating factors largely overlap and permit the sanctioning individual or body to consider any
other relevant (under the Bank's Sanctions Procedures) or appropriate (under the FAR) factors. Furthermore, the Sanctions
Board or EO and the SDO may consider the time served as part
of the sanction determination. But the treatment of the range of
sanctions under the FAR and the Bank's rules differ in terms of
the types of sanctions available. The FAR only provides for fixedterm debarment, whereas the EO or the Sanctions Board, as the
case may be, can choose from five types of sanctions. The Bank's
procedures also differ from their FAR counterparts with respect
to the consideration of aggravating circumstances. The Bank
employs a specific list of potentially aggravating factors.
Although the SDO additionally considers aggravating factors,
the FAR does not name any. As such, a sanction greater than the
default position (three years) is only provided for explicitly in the
single circumstance listed above.161
E.

Affiliates

The Bank's procedures provide for the sanctioning of affiliates, which is also the case with debarments under the FAR. The
Bank may temporarily suspend and/or sanction some affiliates of
respondents "so as to prevent circumvention of Bank sanctions
through the use of affiliates or changes in corporate forms."1 62
Under the Bank's Sanctions Procedures, "[ajn entity is an 'affili160 World Bank, Sanctioning Guidelines at *2 (cited in note 108). See also Anne-Marie
Leroy and Frank Fariello, The World Bank Group Sanctions Process and Its Recent Reforms, 4-5 (World Bank 2011), online at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAW
JUSTICE/Resources/SanctionsProcess.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012); World Bank, Information Note at 6-8 (cited in note 106).
161 As referenced in note 84 and accompanying text, violation of the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 allows for a five-year debarment term.
162 Leroy and Fariello, The World Bank Group Sanctions Process at 17 (cited in note
160). See also World Bank, InformationNote at 9, 20 (cited in note 106).
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ate' of another entity if: (i) either entity controls or has the power
to control the other, or (ii) a third party controls or has the power
to control both entities,"163 while "'[clontrol' means the ability to
direct or cause the direction of the policies or operations of another entity, whether through the ownership of voting securities,
by contract or otherwise." 164 If the EO temporarily suspends
and/or recommends the imposition of a sanction on an affiliate
that controls or is under common control with the respondent,
the EO must provide a copy of the Notice to the affiliate, and the
Bank's procedures afford the affiliate procedural rights equivalent to those of the respondent. 6 5 In addition to affiliates, the
Bank may also sanction successors and assigns of sanctioned
parties.1 66
The Bank's definition of affiliate is very similar to that found
in the FAR.1 67 The FAR explains that:
Indicia of control include, but are not limited to, interlocking management or ownership, identity of interests
among family members, shared facilities and equipment,
common use of employees, or a business entity organized
following the debarment, suspension, or proposed debarment of a contractor which has the same or similar management, ownership, or principal employees as the contract or [sic] that was debarred, suspended, or proposed
for debarment.1 6 8
The Bank uses similar language.1 6 9 Figure 6 below provides
a comparison of the two categories.
163 World Bank, InformationNote at 22 (cited in note 106).
164 Id.

165 See World Bank, Sanctions Procedures § 9.04(b) at 29 (cited in note 108). However,
the Preliminary Explanation, Explanation, Response, and other formal submissions of the
affiliate and the respondent must be consolidated unless the EO or Sanctions Board, as a
matter of discretion, determines otherwise. Id.
166 Id § 9.05 at 30. See also Leroy, The World Bank Group Sanctions Process at 18
(cited in note 160); World Bank, InformationNote at 9, 22 (cited in note 106).
.
167 The FAR defines affiliates to mean "associated business concerns or individuals if,
directly or indirectly, [e]ither one controls or can control the other; or [a] third party controls or can control both." 48 CFR §§ 2.101, 9.403.
168 48 CFR § 9.403.
169 See World Bank, InformationNote at 22 (cited in note 106). The World Bank notes
that:
Indicia of control include, but are not limited to, interlocking management or
ownership, identity of interests among family members, shared facilities and
equipment, common use of employees, or a business entity organized following
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FIGURE 6. COMPARISON OF AFFILIATES UNDER THE FAR AND THE
BANK'S SANCTIONS SYSTEM
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direct or cause the direction of
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ownership of voting securities, by
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not limited to:
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that has the same or
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Effect of Sanctions
1. Public disclosure.

Like debarments under the FAR, sanctions imposed by the
Bank are publicly disclosed. The name of the sanctioned respondent, together with the sanction(s) imposed, is publicly
available on the "World Bank Listing of Ineligible Firms & Indithe imposition of a sanction that has the same or similar management, ownership, or principal employees as the person that was suspended or debarred.
Id.
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viduals" on the Bank's website. 17 0 Additionally, for all Notices
issued after January 1, 2011, the Sanctions Board's decisions, as
well as the EO's determinations in uncontested cases, are publicly disclosed and posted on the Bank's website.171 Individual US
agencies may also post final debarment decisions on their websites, but the depth of disclosure and the ease of access are heterogeneous among executive departments.172
2. Cross-debarment.

Those who cheat and steal from one will be debarred by all.
Robert B. Zoellick, Former President, The World Bank173
In 2010, the Bank and other multilateral development banks
(MDBs)174 signed "an agreement to cross-debar firms and individuals found to have engaged in wrongdoing in MDB-financed
development projects."175 Accordingly, "entities debarred by one
MDB may be sanctioned for the same misconduct by the other
participating development banks."176 This action validated the
MDBs' earlier commitment "to explore further how compliance
170 The "World Bank Listing of Ineligible Firms & Individuals" is available online at
http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?theSitePK=84266&contentMDK=640698
44&menuPK=116730&pagePK=64148989&piPK=64148984 (visited Sep 10 2012).
171 See World Bank, Sanctions Procedures § 10.01(b) at 30 (cited in note 108); World
Bank Sanctions Board, Law Digest at 18 (cited in note 144) ("In September 2010, the
Bank Group established an independent Sanctions Board Secretariat to provide dedicated
legal and administrative support to efficiently manage the Sanctions Board's caseload,
carry out research, and assist in preparing substantive opinions for publication."). In
addition to disclosing the identities of sanctioned or suspended firms and individuals, the
World Bank-in a first among multilateral development institutions-discloses information about past Sanctions Board decisions, illustrating "the types of cases received and
the legal principles the Sanctions Board has applied in deciding liability and sanctions."
World Bank Group, World Bank Shines Spotlight on Anti-Corruptionwith New Sanctions
Board Law Digest (World Bank Dec 9, 2011), online at http://go.worldbank.org/MUYRYS
VDRO (visited Sept 10, 2012).
172 Compare the List of Recent Debarments at the Department of the Air Force General Counsel website, online at http://www.safgc.hq.af.millorganizations/ger/listofrecent
debarments/index.asp (visited Sept 10, 2012), with the "Debarment and Suspension Contested Case Determinations" at the EPA website, online at http: //www.epa.gov/ogdlsdd/
decision.htm (visited Sept 10, 2012).
173 World Bank Sanctions Board, Law Digest at 5 (cited in note 144).
174 The list of other MDBs that are parties to the cross-debarment agreement includes
the African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Inter-American Development Bank Group. See The
World Bank Group, Cross-DebarmentAccord Steps Up Fight Against Corruption (World
Bank Apr 9, 2010), online at http://go.worldbank.org/B699B73Q00 (visited Sept 10, 2012).
175 Id.

176 Id.
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and enforcement actions taken by one institution can be supported by the others." 7 7 Since the Bank signed the "Agreement for
Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions" in April 2010,178 a
respondent debarred for more than one year is subject to crossdebarment, whereby the other participating MDBs may also debar the respondent. 79
The MDBs had previously agreed on harmonized definitions
for corrupt practice, fraudulent practice, collusive practice, and
coercive practice in 2006.180

G.

Settlements

The Bank mechanism most analogous to an administrative
agreement under the FAR is the negotiated resolution agreement, or settlement. INT and a respondent may reach a negotiated resolution of sanctions proceedings at any point during the
sanctions proceedings prior to the issuance of a decision by the
Sanctions Board. INT and a respondent may also resolve potential sanctions cases via settlement during the investigation stage
prior to the commencement of sanctions proceedings.181
The Bank's procedures provide for a number of procedural
and substantive safeguards to ensure the fairness, transparency,
and credibility of the settlement process.1 82 To this end, the
Bank's General Counsel must clear all settlement agreements,1 83
and settlements also are subject to a review by the EO to confirm
that: (1) the respondent entered into the agreement "freely and
fully informed of the terms thereof, and without any form of du177 Id.

178 The agreement is available online at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/
Resources/AgreementForMutualEnforcementofDebarmentDecisions.pdf (visited Sept 10,
2012).
'79 See World Bank, Information Note at 9 (cited in note 106). See generally Stephen
S. Zimmermann and Frank A. Fariello Jr, Coordinating the Fight Against Fraud and
Corruption: Agreement on Cross-Debarment Among Multilateral Development Banks, 3
World Bank Legal Rev 189 (2012).
1so See InternationalFinancialInstitutionsAnti-Corruption Task Force, 2 (Sept 2006),
online at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOIIIResources/FinallFITaskForceFram
ework&Gdlines.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012).
181 World Bank, Sanctions Procedures§§ 11.01, 11.02 at 31-32 (cited in note 108). See
also World Bank, Information Note at 8-9 (cited in note 106); Leroy and Fariello, World
Bank Group Sanctions Process at 20 (cited in note 160). The formal mechanism for settlements was introduced in 2010. Prior to 2010, the Bank had resolved two sanctions
cases through settlements. See id.
182 World Bank, Information Note at 9 (cited in note 106).
183 Id.
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ress," and (2) the agreed sanction, if any, does not entail a manifest violation of certain provisions of the Bank's Sanctions Procedures, "or any guidance issued by the Bank in respect thereof."1 84
If, after the aforementioned review, the EO imposes the agreedupon sanction, the EO notifies INT and the respondent, whereupon the agreement becomes effective-either immediately or as
of a date specified in the agreement.18 5
Under the FAR, administrative agreements often show some
a priori demonstration of present responsibility by the contractor. Such agreements act as a mechanism by which the government can continue to monitor the contractor while the contractor
endeavors to improve its ethics and compliance program.18 6
III. CONCLUSION
Both the US government and the World Bank have devised
suspension and debarment systems to protect their finances and
organizational missions1 87 by excluding certain actors who have
engaged in misconduct (and, under the FAR, otherwise nonresponsible actors) from bidding on contracts. While many similarities exist between the two systems-suspension mechanisms,
notice requirements, the use of settlements, and administrative
agreements-the systems also are quite distinct from each other,
particularly regarding the specific grounds for suspension and
debarment, the concept of present responsibility, the effect of
suspension, and the period of debarment.
One concluding point must be made in reference to the effectiveness of both processes. Observed differences between the two
systems may stem from the respective historical contexts of their
regulatory development and the divergent challenges encountered in international procurement as compared to the acquisi184 World Bank, Sanctions Procedures§ 11.02(a)-(b) at 32 (cited in note 108). See also
Leroy and Fariello, World Bank Group Sanctions Process at 21 & n 85 (cited in note 160);
World Bank, InformationNote at 9 (cited in note 106).
185 World Bank, Sanctions Procedures§ 11.02(c) at 32 (cited in note 108).
186 See Part IIF. See also Interim Administrative Agreement By and Between the Boeing Company and the United States Department of the Air Force (2005), online at
http://www.safgc.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-071102-016.pdf (visited Sept 10,
2012).
187 The protection of finances may not be the sole motivating factor in effective suspension and debarment. The US Air Force, for example, employs the suspension and
debarment process as part of its toolkit in "serv[ing] the [US] Warfighter." Department of
the US Air Force General Counsel, Contractor Responsibility-SAF/GCR, online at
http://www.safgc.hq.af.millorganizations/gcr/index.asp (visited Sept 10, 2012).
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tion process at the US executive agencies. Over the past decade,
both systems have shown vitality and results,1 8 8 suggesting that
creative and diverse approaches to fighting fraud and corruption
in procurement have borne fruit at both domestic and international levels.

188 See, for example, World Bank Sanctions Board, Law Digest at 18 (cited in note
144) ("To date, the [World Bank] sanctions process has led to the debarment of over 400
firms and individuals and the temporary suspension of over 150 firms and individuals.").
As of Sept 10, 2012, the EPLS lists 85,015 current exclusions and 52,353 archived exclusions. See Agency Statistics, online at https://www.epls.gov/dashboard/stats.html (visited
Sept 10, 2012).

